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system, a science. Logic proceeds by this method, just as the other sciences organize their special facts. It is by the harmonious combination and interplay of elementary and reflective judgments, not by thrusting the former out of doors, that the knowledge-process is invigorated and vitalized. The tree of knowledge is rooted in spontaneous judgments. How can we expect fruitage if the roots are severed?

Lack of spontaneity has been fatal to the old formal logic. We may well beware of a similar fate for modern logic if spontaneous judgments are excluded from it.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

An Introduction to Modern Logic: Rupert Clendon Lodge. Minneapolis: Perine Book Co. 1920. Pp. xiv + 361.

What is "modern logic"? Mr. Lodge announces it as "that body of logical theories and method which is usually associated with the names of Lotze, Sigwart, Bradley, Bosanquet, Wundt, Erdmann, and Dewey." This identifies it as the doctrine characteristic of a movement, not of a period. But what is it that the logical theories of Bosanquet and Dewey have in common—or did Mr. Lodge put in Dewey merely to make the conundrum more difficult? The reviewer (being prejudiced on the subject) thought he knew the answer: "Modern logic" is a new name for ancient dialectic. But this book makes him doubt. The splendid chiaroscuro of most contributions to "modern logic" but serves to accentuate the brilliant polemic. Here, however, all polemic is deliberately avoided, and the development is entirely constructive. Avoidance of the controversial is carried to the point of omitting all discussion of the relation of "modern logic" to the Aristotelian tradition and to the various developments of recent years which are neither Aristotelian nor "modern." "For all such omissions, as well as for what is included, the sole justification is the nature of an introductory treatise. It has seemed best to avoid polemics on the one hand, and an unmanageable multiplicity of hypotheses on the other, in favor of a certain singleness of purpose and organic unity of thought" (p. v.).

In this purpose to develop comprehensively the constructive theory of "modern logic," the author has admirably succeeded. The presentation marches. Compactness, explicitness, the constant use of illustration, and clarity in development are its outstanding features.

Ten chapters are devoted to "Judgment," seven to "Inference," and twelve to "Scientific Method."

Judgments are classified as (1) of perception, (2) of experience, (3) symbolic, and (4) transcendent. These types are regarded as "stages" of judgment, after the fashion which is characteristic both of the Hegelian school and of pragmatic preference for psychological categories. On the whole, the exposition leans more to the Bosanquetian identity-in-difference point of view than to the genetic. All judgments of perception formulate something actually presented to the senses. Judgments of experience include memory; they are "like a composite photograph" of many perceptions. Symbolic judgments involve the construction of a *new* object from previous experience elements. Transcendent judgments pass beyond actual or possible human experience. These stages are relative; all judgments involve both a sensory and an intellectual factor. From perceptual to transcendent, the sensory element grows less prominent and the intellectual more important. All judgment is, in fact, an intellectual organization of sensory experience: the secret of it is, of course, identity in difference.

Inference is regarded as analytically expanded judgment. It stands in opposition to unanalyzed impression or intuitive judgment, and is always hypothetical. It is, further, constructive, requiring an intellectual model which fits the situation. And inference is judgment which produces the "new."

The third part of the book, devoted to scientific method, contains an immense amount of detail. Here, as elsewhere, the discussion sticks to topics of the most general sort, though there are frequent illustrations and applications. Analysis and synthesis, definition, classification, the relations of deduction and induction, the nature and types of proof are discussed. There never has been a wholly satisfactory treatise on scientific method: probably the subject is at present unmanageable. But when the topic is touched upon, it almost seems as if it should be in the spirit of careful study of the actual technique of the various sciences, particularly the more systematic and exact sciences. In spite of constant illustration, Mr. Lodge leaves something here to be desired. For instance—perhaps this instance is extreme rather than typical—we come upon the heads, "Methods of Scientific Analysis, (A) Mathematical," and considering the extraordinary advance of analytic methods in mathematics during the last century, we might hope for concrete and somewhat detailed discussion of mathematical procedures. Instead we find this: ". . . In all the natural sciences, mathematical analysis is an auxiliary method of the greatest importance. So far as it goes, it is sufficiently exact, and it tends to leave the material in better shape for a more final analysis. For instance, how long should a Dachshund of given girth, head, and tail, be in the body in order to give the most esthetical satisfaction?'' (p. 214).

Since in this book the reader is not continually diverted from the constructive development by the critical interests of controversy, it offers an especially good opportunity to assess the adequacy of ''modern logic'' as a formulation of the criteria of right thinking. If it intends to displace the traditional or other more recently developed criteria, in this book its failure can not be hid. Imagine what success one would have in testing scientific thought or an every-day formulation of opinion by the following, which summarizes the topic of judgment:

> . . . Judgment is the intellectual organization of sensory experience, the introduction of intellectual standards into the sensory consciousness so as to give us, in place of the even but vague sensory flow, a clear-cut intellectualized essence which is fit to take its place in the ultimate ideal of organization, the system of knowables. This system is not only thinkable through and through, but must be connected with the sensory consciousness in such a way that our judgments can be verified, can be, not merely *thought*, but *known*. The conceptual, intellectualized essence must be the essence *of the sensory experience*, *i. e.*, must give us a meaning which is not a pure creation of intellectual manipulation, but is implicitly present from the very first, embodied in our experience even at the sensory level. Judgment, then, is both sensory and intellectual; it is valid precisely so far as it is what it professes to be. If the sensory side of the experience is acceptable to direct sensory apprehension, and the intellectual organization is thoroughly consistent, and if, finally, the judgment is the intellectual organization *of* the sensory experience in question, then the judgment is valid.[1]

One who could use successfully such criteria of judgment, would not need any. It is not that anything here is incorrect—though volumes might be written in discussion of that: this simply does not concern the problem to which exact or formal logic addresses itself. ''Modern logic'' subserves ''knowledge about'' right thinking, not ''acquaintance with:'' it bespeaks preoccupation with difficult and general questions of psychology and epistemology to the exclusion of the more soluble problems of validity in judgment and inference. Every logician is at least interested in ''modern logic,'' and many outside the ''modern'' school contribute to it—only they call it by another name.

But what's in a name! Mr. Lodge's book is a careful and well-written presentation of whatever it is a presentation of.

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[1] Pp. 106–107.